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INTRODUCTION 
Rationalisation is the main slogan of the present genera· 
tion, though its need is felt more or less in all ages. Nor 
is its need limited to the world of industry. It is required 
in various other fields. In connection with the tariff, too, 
its need is keenly felt if one would only take pains to look 
over it. One may indeed say that in no other field is 
rationalisation more urgently necessary than that of inter· 
national tariff. There is a movement in our own country 
advocating free trade. The movement probably has as its 
object a rationalisation of the tariff. One should, however, 
doubt the wisdom of going extremes in carrying out such a 
scheme. On the other hand, it should be noted that, while 
the existing protective tariff arranged and enforced in great 
confusion is highly irrational, its reckless abolition would 
not give rise to a better situation. It would be impossible 
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to adopt an unqualified free trade policy in a country like 
Japan having an over-population and industries still in their 
infancy, and being confronted with the necessity of under-
taking greater industrialisation in every phase of her economic 
life. In such a country it would be necessary to adopt a 
protective policy of some form to be enforced to some extent. 
Thus, we face the question as to how such a protective 
tariff can be made most rational in the circumstances. 
I shall not here touch in detail the question of tariff for 
revenue purposes. Although its rationalisation is desirable, 
suffice it here to point out that its refonn is to be made 
according to the general principle of the domestic consump-
tion taxes. I have discussed this question on many other 
occasions and I will not repeat myself here. For many years 
my mind has been occupied with the problems of protective 
tariff, but I have been unable to think out any definite 
solution until quite recently. This brief essay, I hope, will 
offer some material toward the solution of this important 
problem. 
PART 1. 
RATIONAL PROTECTIVE TARIFF BASED UPON OLD 
NOTIONS AND THE DIFFICULTY 
OF ITS REALISATION 
(1). Old rational protective tariff-In practical applica-
tion it is impossible to distinguish clearly between protective 
tariff and revenue tariff, although such a demarcation has 
been recognized in theory. In actual practice, protective 
customs duties contain fiscal intentions. This has been 
especially shown in the case of nations suffering from post-
war financial difficulties. Protective tariff may be defin~d in 
the abstract as a duty imposed on a particular article pro-
duced abroad for equalising its production cost (including 
all the transportation charges levied on the article before 
it reaches the market) in case the production cost of the 
same article produced within the importing country is higher 
.---~---' ------~-.~--~------~--~-. 
THE RATIONALISATION OF THE PROTECTIVE TARIFF 3 
than the value of the imported article. The purpose of a 
protective tariff is to maintain domestic industry or industries 
and assist their growth so that they may become enabled to 
compete with foreign industries. 
(2). Difficulties of realisation. 
(A). Difficulty experienced at the time the amount of 
difference is decided on. 
(a). Difficulty of comprehending production cost-As I 
. have stated, the rate of a protective tariff may be fixed at the 
difference between the production costs of the exporting and 
importing countries. However, it is a most difficult task to 
comprehend production cost. In trying to find the produc-
tion cost for some particular industry in this country, we 
shall find that different industrial units are placed under 
varying circumstances, so that the cost of some establish-
ments will be greater or less than others. Under such 
circumstances, one will have to decide which one of the 
following alternatives to choose,-greater cost, small cost or 
their average. Whichever one is adopted as the basis of 
calculation, there will be a great difference in the result. 
From the standpoint of the consumers, the adoption of the 
smallest production cost would be highly desirable but it 
would prove cruel for the producers. The adoption of the 
highest production cost would be welcome to the producers, 
but would require too great a sacrifice on the part of the 
consuming public. Thus, the adoption of the average would 
be sound. However, some respect may be paid to the view 
that, in view of the greater importance of the interests of 
the consuming public over those of producers, the smallest 
production cost be adopted and the industry be left to fortune 
as to survival and development. Thus, the choice is nar-
rowed to the two alternatives, namely, the average production 
cost and the smallest production cost. As' to the production 
cost in exporting countries, the adoption of the smallest cost 
should be advocated as greater power of competition will be 
developed against the importing country's industry. Thus, 
the selection of the production cost offers a preliminary 
--------' 
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theoretical difficulty. Even after deciding on the cost, the 
practical quest for such a cost would be very difficult. 
Moreover, such a production cost is subject to a perpetual 
change, so that it is most difficult to grasp with precision. 
The difficulty is increased because of the uncertainty in the 
nature of the materials used in the computation of the pro-
duction cost. 
(b). Difficulty of estimating the degree of the effect of 
the tariff on prices-The imposition of customs duties does 
not necessarily raise the domestic prices always pari passu 
with their rates. In some cases, they do raise the prices: 
in other cases the effect is partial: in still other cases, the 
effect is nil. The nature of the effects is dependent on so 
many things. It depends on the degree of power of the 
importing and exporting countries. Or, to be more specific, 
such factors as the following will determine its nature: the 
degree of necessity of the commodities for people's life; whe-
ther there is a substitute for them or not; the extent to which 
the foreign supply of the commodities satisfies the domestic 
demand; the importance of the amount of demand on the 
part of the importing country for the exporting country; the 
comparative ratio between the production costs of the com-
modities in both countries; the amount of fixed capital 
employed by the supplying country; whether there is any 
competition among several supplying countries; whether 
there are cartels, trusts and other combinations in the 
supplying country or countries. Where the commodity 
comes under the category of necessaries, its duty tends to 
raise not only its price, but also the prices of other com-
modities, so that utmost attention must be paid to the 
customs duties on necessaries. At any rate it is most 
difficult to predict to what extent a tariff duty will raise the 
commodity on which it is levied in the demanding country, 
and its valuation is bound to prove somewhat incorrect. 
Such a valuation, however, could be modified after the 
. enforcement of the duty. Such a modification may be made 
several times if necessary. Of course, frequent modifications 
------------,-----------------
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are possible only in theory. Modification in the light of 
actual experience is also difficult of practice. In short, the 
prediction of the effects of a tariff duty on prices is liable 
to fail because of their complex nature. Nor can the frequent 
revisions of tariff duties be desirable as the unstability of 
the life of anyone rate of duty will shake the foundations 
of business and industrial production. For this reason, the 
tariff duties once fixed are often maintained for a long 
period of time, and in case the first valuation is mistaken, 
the duties may prove to be unjustly high, or low as the 
case may be. 
(B). Existence of tariff duties rendered unjust by later 
changes. 
(a). Viewed from the development of domestic industries 
-It is possible that some tariff duties which were appropriate 
at the time of their institution and enabled domestic industries 
to be developed may become inappropriate by reason of the 
changed conditions of later times. In the first place, ordinary 
protective tariff assists industries. It helps producers at the 
expense of consumers who are affected by the temporary 
inflation of prices. It enables producers to make various 
needed improvement so that they are enabled to reduce their 
cost of production and thus be placed in a position where 
they can compete against foreign producers even in the 
absence of the tariff. Thus, the purpose of protective tariff 
is to promote the lasting interests of consumers and pro· 
ducers at the temporary sacrifice of the interests of con· 
sumers, and to cultivate the productive capacity of a country. 
This means that protective tariff is destined to come to an 
end at a certain point in the course of time. In actual 
practice, however, it is continued indefinitely despite the fact 
that productive output is increased and production cost ·is 
reduced. Because of this continuation of protection, the 
great mass of consumers are continuously placed in a posi· 
tion of loss and detriment, while producers gain unjustifiably 
great profits; prices in general are also raised (as has been 
already said the rise would be greater in the case of tariff 
4_ • 
1 
6 M. KAMBE 
duties on necessaries than on luxuries), export business is 
placed in an unfavourable position; and balance a nation's 
financial position with difficulty. 
For this reason, it is the duty of the government autho· 
rities to make a constant study of the conditions of protective 
tariff and should reduce or abolish the duties once established. 
In case an industry is unable to stand on its own feet and 
needs perpetual protection, it should be left to its natural 
fate as being unentitled to protection. In such a case, the 
discontinuation of protection is desirable at least from the 
standpoint of the consumers. Unless there be some special 
reason for protection, no perpetual protection should be 
given to any industry. In actual practice, however, this 
point is often neglected and the irrationality exists of con· 
tinuing a tariff duty even after its use has been outlived by 
real needs and necessities, thereby resulting in undue profits 
for a few producers and in loss and detriment to the mass 
of consumers as well as to the producers that use as material 
the object on which the duty is imposed. 
(b). From changes in foreign industries-Domestic in· 
dustries may make some progress or improvement, but at 
the same time foreign industries in the same field may make 
still greater strides forward. Seldom does it happen that 
foreign industries make a retrogression, in which case a given 
tariff becomes excessive even though domestic industries do 
not make any advance. Where foreign industries make an 
advance to a much greater degree than do domestic in· 
dustries, the tariff once fixed would become incapable of 
protecting domestic industries but at the same time would 
oppress the interests of the consuming public. In such case, 
a close enquiry into the situation should be made, and if the 
industries do really need protection, the rates should be 
raised 'to a reasonable extent; or, if there be no justification 
for such a step, the tariff should be abolished outright. But 
in the former case when foreign industries fail to keep up 
to the mark, thereby making protection too great, the tariff. 
should be reduced. In all cases, it is a most difficult task 
--,---_. __ .----_. 
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to keep up the tariff rates commensurate with changes in 
domestic and foreign conditions. 
(C). From changes in prices-Changes in prices may be 
due either to foreign or domestic causes, the result being 
that a tariff may become either too high or too insufficient 
to afford protection to domestic industries. Different causes 
give birth to different results. Prices are also subject to 
constant variation. From this point alone it will be seen 
that it is almost impossible for a tariff to give adequate 
protection to industries. Let us consider this question by 
taking several typical cases. Suppose prices have become 
depreciated. When this has come to pass because of some 
domestic causes, supposing that price levels have become 
reduced by ten percent on account of the raising of the gold 
export embargo by this country. This would amount to a 
raise of ten percent in the tariff rate in the case of a specific 
tariff and thus would prove a too great protection; but in 
the case of an ad valorem tariff, protection would be some· 
what insufficient. Again, suppose prices in the United States 
have become depreciated by five percent due to economic 
depression. Then she can supply her commodities to this 
country that much cheaper, and we will have to lower the 
market prices of our domestic commodities which are in 
competition with those produced in America, even though 
there be no internal reason to do so. In this case, if the 
duty is due to a specific tariff, the insufficiency of protection 
would not be so great as in the case of an ad valorem 
tariff, because in the latter case the duty would be lowered 
which fact would prove detrimental to the native producers 
who will be hit also by the five per cent fall of American 
prices while in the former case the duty is constant. 
Let us next consider the cases in which prices have 
risen. Suppose prices have risen due to some domestic 
causes such as the inflation of currency or an embargo on 
the export of gold. In the case of a specific tariff, its amount 
remains unchanged as it is fixed; but its real value- is 
lowered and protection becomes highly insufficient. The 
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more prices rise, the greater will be the inadequacy of tariff 
protection. In the case of an ad valorem tariff, the results 
would differ according to the nature of the proportion bet· 
ween the foreign exchange and the rise in the prices of 
domestic commodities. If proper balance be maintained 
between the two, there would be neither an excessive pro· 
tection nor an inadequate protection. When prices in a 
country are raised by some extraneous causes-for instance, 
by placing an embargo on the export of gold and by ex-
panding currencies-the prices of commodities imported from 
the countries adopting such financial methods would become 
cheaper in the importing country, which has already raised 
its gold embargo and restored its monetary system to nor-
mality. The results would be the same as if the commodities 
came from the countries where prices are low; a specific 
tariff would provide insufficient protection, but an ad valorem 
tariff would be insufficient to a greater degree than the 
former, and domestic industries would be forced to demand 
a greater protection. It is under such circumstances that a 
flexible tariff and a coefficient of increase, with which I shall 
deal shortly, came to be adopted in some countries. 
PART II. 
METHODS OF TARIFF RATIONALISATION 
As I have pointed out, it is highly difficult to institute 
a rational tariff, and a rate once fixed and proved appro-
priate at the time of its institution may become otherwise 
as time passes. I shall now deal with the problem of how 
to rationalise the tariff, and enumerate some important 
methods of tariff rationalisation as follows: 
(1). Abolition of protective tariff-This method will be 
the only way of meeting tariff problems from the standpoint 
of the free trade theory. Those who advocate free trade 
declare that each nation should pursue only those industries 
in which she excels. A policy such as this would be im-
possible of immediate adoption by such a country as Japan 
--------~-----~.~ 
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which is faced by a great industrial depression and un· 
manageable unemployment, especially in view of the fact 
that the freedom of migration is strictly limited at every 
tum and the free movement of commodities is universally 
prevented by tariff walls. 
(2). Further raising of the protective tariff-This may 
appear rational from the standpoint of tariff protection. 
Advocates of this scheme are so earnest in their, program 
of protection that they are willing to undergo the risk of 
national exclusion as a consequence. They argue something 
like this: .. Although free frade is an ideal for all nations, 
it is impossible for this country alone to adopt such a prin· 
ciple in the face of the fact that all other nations are occupied 
in erecting higher tariff walls against one another. She will 
be placed in a great economic difficulty if she resort to such 
a trade policy, for her imports will be greatly increased 
while her export business would come to a standstilL We 
should, therefore, cease depending on foreign markets and 
should direct our efforts toward the development of our 
domestic market for domestic industries. This is safer and 
better." Such a view has a measure of truth and should 
have a rightful place in economic thought. However, its 
impracticability in the case of a country like Japan is too 
obvious to require special demonstration. We are not self· 
sufficient in the supply of raw materials and foodstuffs, and 
we have to export manufactured goods to an amount equal 
to that of the deficit in raw material and foodstuffs. Nay, 
we have to export in order to make up previous loans and 
the interest on them, and to do this we must reduce the 
prices of domestic commodities as much as possible; and 
this, in tum, will require that tariff rates should be kept as 
low as possible. We must, therefore, strenuously oppose 
any attempt to raise the tariff rates. 
(3). Middle ground-All that discussion brings us to 
the middle ground. In other words, the status quo should 
be taken as the basis but improvements should be made 
thereon, by rationalising its features. In dealing with such a 
---~---.-------" 
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policy as the tariff affecting the economic life of the masses, 
radical changes should be regarded as taboo. Gradualism 
should dictate all changes. Thus, the middle ground seems 
to be the best attitude. In medio tutissimus ibis. There 
are the following practical methods each of which is based 
upon the recognition of the advisability of this wholesome 
attitude. 
CAl. Constant examination and revision of tariff-That 
the tariff should be placed under constant examination and 
re·examination and the needed revisions be made in order 
to adapt it to changing conditions, is a fine idea but difficult 
of realization. Conditions often change even immediately 
after a re·examination of the tariff has been completed and 
by the time a revision is effected by law, it has become 
belated and hence, inappropriate. Frequent revisions of the 
tariff would disturb the stability of business and prove 
detrimental to the traders concerned. Because of all these 
considerations, the adoption of this method does not seem 
well·advised. 
(Bl. Tariff on a Sliding Scale-This method is intended 
to adapt tariff rates to price levels. A similar idea after the 
Great War has led to the application of sur· taxes and a 
coefficient of increase to tariff by nations on the ground that 
their currencies had depreciated and prices had soared. This 
method is not without its merits. Under this scheme, tariff 
rates vary according to the basis of the index number of 
prices and thus protection is assured independently of the 
arbitrariness of government officials. But it cannot be said 
to be a desirable method inasmuch as it does not consider 
factors other than price levels in fixing the tariff rates. 
(C). Flexible Tariff-This method has been practised in 
the United States in recent years. The American tariff law 
contains the so·called "flexible clause". Under the opera· 
tion of this special clause, when a given tariff is recognised 
to be inadequate to make up the difference between pro· 
duction cost in the United States and foreign production 
cost, the President is empowered to raise, subject to the 
-.- .. --~-~----- -------~--~--- ----------
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approval of the tariff committee, the rate by less than five 
percent. In case the raise thus made by the President 
should prove insufficient, he is also empowered to make a 
public declaration of the same fact, and to levy a new rate 
based upon sale prices in the United States, within 15 days 
following the time of the Presidential declaration. 
The adoption of a similar scheme was recommended by 
the Tariff Investigation Commission of our country in 1929 
in presenting its recommendations regarding the preparations 
to be made for the lifting of the embargo on the export of 
gold. The Tariff Commission favored the empowering the 
Government to alter tariff rates within ten percent upon the 
recommendation of a special tariff body to be created. A 
similar power is given the Government regarding the tariff 
on rice alone. A flexible tariff enables the adaptation of 
rates to changes not only in prices but also in the production 
of both importing and exporting countries. However, there 
is a legal limit to the percentage of revision (although this 
is not the case in the United States), and this may prove 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, the empowering a special tariff 
body to decide on the matter may give rise to party scandals 
and arbitrariness. Nor will it be possible to carry out 
calculations of high complexity regarding thousands of com· 
modities. One cannot adopt this method without hesitation. 
(D). Diminishing Tariff-In my opinion, no tariff should 
be perpetual. On the contrary, its time limit should always 
be specified by law. (This does not apply to agricultural 
tariff which is national in importance and whose chronic 
disadvantages may place consumers in a condition of un· 
bearable suffering.) Producers should be urged to make 
improvements in their methods within the specified. time 
limit so that the cost of production may become reduced. 
I would suggest successive diminution of tariff rates, each 
such diminution being made at the expiry of the fixed period, 
so that in course of time the tariff would be abolished all 
together. Suppose a given industry requires 20 years in 
which to develop itself so as to stand on its own feet in 
-----------.--~ 
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competition with foreign producers. (Different limits of years 
may be fixed for different industries.) Then, the tariff should 
be put into force for the period of 20 years. When the first 
five years have passed, one fourth of the tariff rate should 
be reduced. At the end of the next five years, the reduc-
tion should be made to the extent of one half of the original 
rate, three-fourths at the end of the third lustrum and the 
entire rate abolished at the end of the fourth and last five 
years. If such a scheme be adopted, producers receiving 
protection would be ever diligent and industrious and would 
endeavor to reduce the cost of production as far as possible, 
thereby resulting in the harmony of interests between pro-
ducers and consumers. If no improvement in this respect 
is made by the expiration of the period of tariff, producers 
are to blame. If they are unable to carry on their enterprise 
unaided by tariff protection, it is because they have neglected 
to do their utmost in improving their industrial enterprises, 
and the State has no responsibility to assist them any longer. 
Some producers may effect the desired improvements before 
the period of protection has ended and thus may receive 
its special benefits. However, such benefits should be con-
ferred on them as a sort of bonus for their endeavors, and 
consumers should be content with such an arrangement. 
True, it would be a difficult task to decide on the proper 
original rate, and often protection thus given may prove 
excessive. But inasmuch as a definite period is provided 
and a diminishing rate part of the scheme, consumers may 
as well make a graceful sacrifice. Such a scheme would he 
easily borne by the public for the sake of a definite period, 
even when a rate, though at first a propos, may become 
otherwise under changed conditions. Some may say that my 
plan would not be competent to adapt the rate to changes 
in the prices of commodities; but the fact is that no tariff 
scheme is entirly adequate. to meeting this difficulty. More-
over, better results may be obtained by supplementing my 
plan with the coefficient of increase, so as to adjust the rate 
more efficiently to the changed prices. It may be said that 
------------------------- ----------------
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protection would prove insufficient if foreign producers should 
make much greater improvements than domestic producers 
under my scheme. But industries that are not able to 
compete with foreign industries despite the tariff protection 
given them, should be left to its natural fate. 
CONCLUSION 
The ideal object of a protective tariff is to make up the 
difference between the domestic cost of production for some 
specified commodities and that of foreign competitors. It is 
difficult to fix an appropriate rate of tariff in the beginning, 
and a rate appropriate at its inception becomes otherwise 
when changes come with later times. Although under tariff 
protection domestic industries may be developed, production 
cost be reduced, and the profits of producers increased, if 
protection is maintained for a long period of time, producers 
will secure too great profits at the expense of the consuming 
public. Under some circumstances, protection may prove 
inadequate. Something must be done in order to eliminate all 
this irrationality. The abolition of the tariff or the erection of 
higher tariff walls would be too extreme a step. The middle 
way should be pursued. Constant revision of the tariff may 
be proposed but it is impracticable, and pregnant with abuses. 
I urge the adoption of a system of successive diminutions of 
tariff rates, as I belive it has numerous merits when com· 
pared with other systems. Should it prove unsatisfactory, 
some other method might be attached in order to supplement 
it. 
MASAO RAMBE 
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